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Abstract 
 
  A  wireless  sensor  network  (WSN)  now 
becomes popular in context awareness development 
to  distribute  critical  information  and  provide 
knowledge  services  to  everyone  at  anytime  and 
anywhere.  However,  the  data  transfer  in  a  WSN 
potentially  encounters  many  threats  and  attacks. 
Hence,  particular  security  schemes  are required  to 
prevent them. A WSN usually uses low power, low 
performance, and limited resources devices. One of 
the  most  promising  alternatives  to  public  key 
cryptosystems  is  Elliptic  Curve  Cryptography 
(ECC),  due  to  it  pledges  smaller  keys  size.  This 
implies  the  low  cost  consumption  to  calculate 
arithmetic operations in cryptographic schemes and 
protocols.  Therefore,  ECC  would  be  strongly 
required  to  be  implemented  in  WSN  embedded 
devices with limited resources (i.e., processor speed, 
memory, and storage). In this paper, we present an 
implementation of security system on IEEE802.15.4 
WSN device with the employment of Elliptic Curve 
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Elliptic 
Curve  Diffie-Hellman  (ECDH)  key  exchange 
protocol.  Our  experimental  results  on  Intel  Mote2  
showed that the total time for signature generation is 
110 ms, signature verification is 134 ms, and ECDH 
shared key generation is 69 ms on the setting of 160-
bit security level. 
 
Keywords: WSN, ECC, ECDSA, ECDH key exchange, 
embedded device. 
 
1. Introduction 
A sensor in a WSN is simply refer to a device 
that  raises  an  electrical  signal  that  contains  a 
valuable information and usually has a property such 
as low cost, low performance, and limited resources 
(i.e., processor speed, memory, and storage) to be 
used  for  developing  context  awareness.  The  main 
goal  of  WSN  is  to  distribute  and  deliver  critical 
information and knowledge services to everyone at 
anytime and anywhere. A WSN may encompass a 
wide  range  of  area  and  support  a  variety  of 
applications  (e.g.,  environment  monitoring, 
disaster/crisis management, home utilization control, 
telematics,  mobile  RFID,  etc).  Besides,  sensor 
networks are essentially connected to user networks 
through common use networks, such as Internet or 
other  public  network  connections.  Thus,  there 
should  be  many  potential  threats  and  attacks  in 
transferring information via a WSN. To overcome 
this  situation,  an  effective  security  system  is 
required to address those problems. 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) now becomes 
popular,  hence  many  researchers  have  taken  in 
account  this  area  of  interest,  such  as  in 
[2],[4],[5],[6]. They have considered in the research 
both in the system design and the implementation. 
However, the data transfer in a WSN potentially 
encounters  many  threats  and  attacks.  Hence, 
particular security schemes are required to prevent 
them.  A  WSN  usually  uses  low  power,  low 
performance, low processor speed, limited memory 
and  storage  size,  such  as  embedded  devices 
[2],[4],[5]. One of the most promising alternatives to 
public key cryptography (e.g., RSA and ElGamal) is 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)[1],[7], due to it 
offers smaller keys size rather than RSA or ElGamal 
for  the  same  level  of  cryptographic  strength.  For 
example, the setting of 160-bit in ECC provides the 
same security level with 1024-bit length of RSA or 
ElGamal.  This  implies  that  ECC  promises  the 
requirements  of  small  space  and  memory  in  the 
implementation  on  embedded  devices  [2],[4].  In 
addition, ECC consumes a low cost calculation of 
arithmetic operations in cryptographic schemes and 
protocols [5]. Therefore, ECC is the best candidate 
and  suitable  algorithm  to  be  implemented  on  the 
WSN embedded devices. 
One  of  small  operating  systems  implemented 
for constructing a secure WSN based on the use of 
ECC  is  TinyOS  [2],[4].  There  also  has  been 
introduced a low cost ECC on the implementation of 
WSN  [5],  and the  construction  of  secure  ECC  on 
WSN  [6].  In  this  paper,  we  present  an Communication and Network Systems, Technologies and Applications 
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implementation of security scheme on IEEE802.15.4 
WSN device, namely Intel Mote2 platform [10] with 
the employment of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm (ECDSA) and Diffie-Hellman (DH) key 
exchange protocol to realize our security system in 
WSN. 
 
2. Security Requirements 
In  modern  wireless  communication  systems 
including WSN, the security and efficiency features 
have to  be  considered. In addition to the common 
networking threats and attacks, especially in WSNs, 
these kind of threats and attacks include: (1) sensor 
node  compromise  that  is  caused  when  sensors  in 
WSN are being attacked or compromised or may be 
an  attacker  inserting  illegal  sensors  to  an  existing 
system;  (2)  eavesdropping  which  is  performed  by 
monitoring  transmissions  between  nodes;  (3) 
compromise or exploration of sensed data; (4) denial 
of service (DoS) attacks which try to block sensors 
and    communications;  and  (5)  malicious  use  or 
misuse in WSN for illegal purposes. To encounter 
these problems, in this section, we briefly describe 
the security requirements needed by WSN. 
 
2.1 Mutual Authentication 
The situation of illegally nodes to involve in a 
legitimate WSN could be happened in early sensor 
networks  [3].  The  main  goal  is  to  be  granted  for 
accessing  the  important  sensed  data  from  legal 
nodes or gateways. Hence, it is very important for 
all  nodes  to  authenticate  each  other  or  between 
nodes  and  gateways  before  sensed  data  or  other 
important information are being exchanged. 
 
2.2 Nonrepudiation of Service 
To  satisfy  a  good  WSN  design  and  its 
implementations,  it  also  has  to  be  considered  the 
possibility  of  a  node  to  disclaim  the  charges  of 
sending or receiving sensed data or services. Digital 
signature  is  one  of  solutions  to  meet  this  security 
requirement and this feature can easily be applied in 
security protocols. 
 
2.3 Confidentiality 
There  must  be  many  purposes  on  WSN 
including business or commercial tendencies. Thus, 
by  today’s  technology,  illegal  nodes  can  easily 
intercept  radio  signals  propagating  over  the  air  in 
WSN.  As  the  results,  there  exists  disposing  and 
eavesdropping  activities.  To  address  this  problem, 
all nodes in WSN and gateways must deal with on 
the  use  of  keys  to  encrypt  messages  on  every 
communication  session.  Key  exchange,  key 
agreement, and session keys are an important stage 
of the authentication mechanism between nodes and 
gateways. 
 
2.4 Security Algorithm Selection 
In  the  introduction  section  has  already  been 
mentioned that WSN comprises many sensors with 
usually adhere limited resources. For cryptosystem 
protocols,  not  only  security  is  the  most  important 
concern,  but  also  practical  implementation  should 
also  be  considered.  Hence,  a  design  and  selection 
security  algorithm  to  produce  a  very  efficient 
cryptosystem protocol can be implemented in WSN. 
In  addition,  there  are  many  exchanged  messages 
involving  in  this  protocol  and  it  should  consume 
amount memory, thus it is a challenging to design an 
efficient protocol. 
  
3. Elliptic Curve over Fp and Complex 
Multiplication Method 
In  this  section,  we  briefly  describe  the 
fundamental  of  Elliptic  Curves  over  Fp  and  the 
method of Complex Multiplication (CM). The detail 
explanation about elliptic curves and CM method can 
be referred in [1] and [7].  
Let  denote  p  >  3  be  an  odd  prime  number,  a 
prime  field  Fp  which  consists  of  a  set  of  integer 
numbers {0, 1, …, p-1} and also the operations of 
arithmetic, such as addition and multiplication with 
modulo by p. Let also define an elliptic curve E(Fp) 
over Fp is a set of point P which has coefficients (x, 
y)  where  x,  y∈Fp  and  must  fulfill  the  following 
equation:  
y
2 = x
3 + ax + b (mod p)      (1) 
 
where a, b∈ Fp satisfies 4a
3 + 27b
2 ≠ 0. This set of 
point along with the point at infinity, O. The point O 
plays a role of identity component to perform special 
arithmetic  operation  and  defines  an  Abelian  Group 
called  Elliptic  Curve  Group.  The  multiplication 
operation  over  E(Fp)  is  done  based  on  addition 
operation as follows: 
Q = k × P = P + P + … + P    (2) 
 
 
where k∈Z, and Z is integer numbers. In addition, 
let denote Q and P are points on E(Fp). The point P 
= (x, y) has an order m, which is the smallest integer 
k that satisfies: k × P = O. The order m of an elliptic 
curve E(Fp) is the number of points on E(Fp), where 
k ≤ m. The discriminant ∆ of E(Fp) and j-invariant 
are defined by: 
∆ = -16(4a
3 + 27b
2), where j = -1728(4a)
2/∆  (3) 
 
On the given a j-invariant j0∈Fp and j0 ≠ 0.1728. 
Then, an E(Fp) can be easily generated by set of a = 
3k mod p and b = 2k mod p, where k = j0/(1728-j0). 
The  second  elliptic  curve  called  twist  from  the 
previous constructed elliptic curve can be defined as 
follows: 
y
2 = x
3 + ac
2x + bc
3      (4) 
 
where  c  is  any  quadratic  non-residue  in  Fp.  After 
completing  the  construction  of  two  elliptic  curves 
k Communication and Network Systems, Technologies and Applications 
    117 
(equations  (1) and  (4)), the  E(Fp)  with an  order  m 
ensures the intractability  of  solving the problem of 
Discrete  Logarithm  Problem  (DLP)  on  the  elliptic 
curve  group  when  constructing  an  elliptic  curve 
based cryptosystem. 
To construct elliptic curve by using CM method, 
firstly we need to select a suitable order m which can 
be defined by calculating j-invariant. Then, the CM 
method is started from the selecting of a prime p and 
finding the smallest D which is a discriminant value 
of CM method on p. Let denote two integer values, u 
and v that satisfies the following equations: 
4p = u
2 + Dv
2 and m = p + 1 ± u.    (5) 
 
Then, it must be checked whether p + 1 – u or p + 1 + 
u are suitable orders for constructing elliptic curve. 
Otherwise, such procedure must be repeated, if not 
the  next  step  is  based  on  the  value  of  D  to  create 
Hilbert polynomials [1],[3] and find their roots. The 
root  is  created  from  j-invariant  when  generating 
elliptic curve and its twist or the second curve. Then 
Lagrange method is used to select a suitable one of 
the two elliptic curves by picking randomly point P 
from  each  elliptic  curve  randomly  until  the  point 
fulfills equation: m × P ≠ O is found. Then, another 
curve can be judged as the right one. 
Computationally,  CM  method  is  costly  when 
calculating  Hilbert  polynomials,  due  to  a  lot  of 
coefficients, but it produces a high precision floating 
point and complex arithmetic operations. To address 
this problem, but still uses the advantage property of 
Hilbert  polynomials,  CM  method  adopts  Weber 
polynomials in addition of Hilbert polynomials. This 
phenomenon is described detail in [1]. 
 
3.1 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA) 
An elliptic curve E(Fp) over Galois Field GF(p) with 
large  of  order  p  and  a  point  P  of  large  order  are 
selected and made them public to all nodes. Then, a 
pair  of  public  key  and  private  key  are  generated. 
Furthermore,  for  each  transaction,  the  signature 
generation  and  verification  are  implemented.  We 
briefly outline the ECDSA as follows: 
 
ECDSA  key  generator:  the  Node  A  performs  the 
following steps: 
I.  Select a random d ∈[2, p-2]. 
II.  Compute Q = d × P 
III.  Public key (pk) and secret key (sk) for Node A is 
a couple of (E(Fp), P, n, Q) and d, respectively. 
 
ECDSA  signature  generation:  Node  A  signs  a 
message M by considering the following steps: 
I.  Select a random integer k ∈[2, p-2]. 
II.  Compute k × P = (x1, y1) and r = x1 mod p. 
A) If only if x1, yI ∈ Fp. 
B) If r = 0, then return to the step I. 
III.  Compute k
-1 mod p. 
IV.  Compute s = k
-1(H(M) + d×r) mod p. 
A) H is a hash algorithm 
B) If s = 0, then return to the step I. 
V.  Signature of message M is a pair of integer (r, 
s). 
 
ECDSA  signature  verification:  Node  B  verifies 
Node  A’s  signature  (r,  s)  for  a  message  M  by 
applying the following steps: 
I.  Compute c = s
-1 mod p and H(M). 
II.  Compute u1 = H(M) ×c mod p and u2 = r×c mod 
p. 
III.  Compute u1 × P + u2 × Q = (x0, y0) and v = x0 
mod p. 
IV.  Signature  can  be  said  valid  if  only  if  v  =  r, 
otherwise it is invalid. 
 
3.2  Elliptic  Curve  Diffie-Hellman  (ECDH)  Key 
Agreement 
Let assume that Node A wants to establish a shared 
key  with  Node  B.  At  first,  two  parties  initiate  and 
deal with the global parameter which is a couple of 
(p, a, b, G) in the prime number Fp. Also, each node 
must have a key pair suitable for elliptic curve E(Fp) 
which consists of a private key d, namely a selected 
random number in the interval [1, p−1] and a public 
key  Q  (where  Q  =  d×G  and  G  is  a  base  point  of 
elliptic curve). Let Node A's key pair be (dA, QA) and 
node B's key pair be (dB, QB). Each node must have 
the other node's public key, thus there should be a 
key  exchange  mechanism  between  them.  Upon 
receiving Node B’s public key, Node A computes a 
shared key k = dA×QB. Similarly, Node B computes k 
= dB×QA. The calculated shared key k by both nodes 
is  equal,  because  dA×QB  =  dA×dB×G  =  dB×dA×G  = 
dB×QA.  The  protocol  is  secure  because  nothing  is 
disclosed (except for the public keys), and no node 
can derive the private key of the other nodes, unless 
the  Elliptic  Curve  Discrete  Logarithm  Problem 
(ECDLP) was solved. 
 
4. Implementation 
In this section, we describe our implementation 
of digital signature and key agreement on Intel Mote2 
and  Laptop  PC.  To  show  the  effectiveness  of  our 
system  implementation,  we  compare  the 
implementation on the Intel Mote2 and on the Laptop 
PC. In addition, we also  compare the experimental 
results  of  using  ECDSA  technique  and  RSA-based 
one. 
 
4.1  The  Architecture  of  Intel  Mote2  IEEE802.15.4 
WSN 
The Intel Mote2 is a sensor device which has a 
set of features especially for constructing a WSN and 
its  supporting  applications,  such  as  industrial 
vibration, structural monitoring, acoustic and visual 
monitoring.  The  main  processor  with  PXA271 
XScale  platform  runs  up  to  416Mhz.  It  is  also 
equipped  with  IEEE802.15.4  wireless  sensor 
network. It also exposes a basic sensor board. Intel Communication and Network Systems, Technologies and Applications 
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Mote2  has  internal  256kB  SRAM,  SDRAM  of 
30Mbytes  and  flash  memory  of  30Mbytes.  The 
PXA271 XScale processor uses the SRAM for both 
instruction and data which is targeted for mobile ad-
hoc routing and bridging functionalities. All working 
functions are supported by the Openembedded Linux 
operating system resides in the flash memory. This 
operating  system  is  licensed  under  the  GPL  that 
includes  a  standard  C  library,  many  applications 
supported,  libraries,  tools,  and  root  file  systems. 
Table 1 shows the detail specifications of Intel Mote2 
device  used  in  this  implementation.  For  detail 
specifications can be found in [10]. 
 
Table 1. Intel Mote2 specifications used in the 
experimental. 
Hardware 
PXA271 XScale processor 416MHz, 256kB 
SRAM, 30MB SDRAM, 30MB flash memory, 
IEEE802.15.4. 
Software  Openembedded Linux O/S kernel-2.6.29, 
gmplib-5.0.5, arm-linux-gcc-3.4.3. 
 
4.2  ECDSA  and  ECDH  Implementation  on  Intel 
Mote2 
We  embed the CM method variant which has 
been presented in [1] to the Intel Mote2. At first, we 
determine a suitable elliptic curve parameters a and b 
to  construct  an  elliptic  curve.  Furthermore,  we 
perform the following basic steps: 
I.  Choose a suitable discriminant value D to find out 
Hilbert and Weber polynomials. 
II.  Pick randomly a prime number p. This number is 
selected if and only if the equation 4p = u
2 + Dv
2 
can be solved (find the two integer values u and 
v). Otherwise, repeat to select other p. 
III. Pick the order of elliptic curve m if one of either 
this equation m = p + 1 – u or m = p + 1 + u is 
satisfied. Otherwise, repeat step I. In addition, m 
also  has  to  be  satisfied  the  following 
requirements: 
A) m ≠ p. 
B) ∀k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 20, p
k ≢ 1 (mod p). 
C) m is a big number (at least 2
160). 
IV. Based  on  the  first  elliptic  curve  and  the  twist 
elliptic  curve,  compute  the  roots  of  Weber 
polynomials by using j-invariants. 
V. Select  one  from  the  two  elliptic  curves  that 
satisfies  equation  mP  =  O.  P  is  selected 
repeatedly until one of P  on each elliptic curve 
fulfills mP ≠ O. 
 
We adopt ECC-LIB [8] and GMP [9] libraries 
in  our implementation,  due  to  the  libraries  provide 
high  precision  calculations  both  in  integer  and 
floating point arithmetic operations. As an embedded 
device, Intel Mote2 also has a limited memory, thus 
adopting the features in ECC-LIB and GMP libraries 
for constructing CM method based elliptic curve is 
suitable for Intel Mote2. 
 
4.3 ECDH Key Agreement Protocol 
Again ECC-LIB and GMP libraries are used to 
construct  the  implementation  of  ECDH  key 
agreement protocol. Figure 1 shows the mechanism 
of implemented ECDH protocol in our secure WSN 
system. 
 Figure 1. Proposed ECDH key agreement protocol. 
 
Figure  1  demonstrates  a  key  agreement  protocol 
between Node A and Node B. In advance, two nodes 
have  dealt  with  the  global  parameter  (p,  a,  b,  G), 
where a and b are elliptic curve coefficients, prime 
number p, and G is the base point which consists of 
coordinate values to construct an elliptic curve. The 
flow of this protocol is as follows: 
I.  Upon  receiving  a  message  from  Node  A  that 
includes identity of Node A IDA, timestamp TS1, 
and Node A’s public key QA = dA×G (where dA 
represents  Node  A’s  private  key),  Node  B 
generates a random Nonce, his public key QB = 
dB×G (dB is Node B’s private key), his timestamp 
TS2, and LifetimeB = TS1-TS2. Here, the used of 
Nonce,  timestamps,  and  Lifetime  is  to  prevent 
reply attacks. Furthermore, he computes a shared 
key  KAB  =  dB×QA  and  signs the  message  which 
includes Nonce, TS2, LifetimeB, and IDB by using 
his private key. Then, the shared key KAB is used 
for encrypting the message and sends the encoded 
message  along  with  signature  SigB  and  QB  to 
Node A. 
II.  Node  A  computes  a  shared  key  KAB  =  dA×QB, 
decrypts  the  encoded  message  into  plaintext 
message which consist of Nonce, TS2, LifetimeB, 
and  IDB  information,  such  that  he  can  verify 
signature  SigB.  Furthermore,  he  checks  whether 
LifetimeB = TS1-TS2 or not. The process will be 
continued to the next step if the equation holds. 
Otherwise,  a  reply  attack  may  occur  and  the 
process is aborted. Then, Node A prepares a new 
timestamp  TS3,  calculates  LifetimeA  =  TS2-TS3, 
encrypts them together with Nonce received from 
Node B by using his shared key KAB, and signs the 
message  into  signature  SigA.  Then,  he  responds 
Node B by sending a couple of (E(KAB, [Nonce || 
TS3  ||  LifetimeA]),  SigA)  to  Node  B.  Where  E 
denotes  an  encryption  algorithm  and  ||  is  the 
concatenation of string in the message. Communication and Network Systems, Technologies and Applications 
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III. Upon receiving a response message from Node A, 
by  using  his  own  KAB,  Node  B  decrypts  the 
message and proves that LifetimeA = TS2-TS3. SigA 
is  verified  successfully  if  only  if  the  equation 
holds and the received Nonce is equal to his own 
Nonce. Otherwise, a reply attack may occur and 
the  process  is  aborted.  Furthermore,  Node  B 
prepares a new timestamp TS4, calculates a new 
lifetime  LifetimeB*  =  TS3-TS4,  and  defines  a 
confirmation  message  Confirm  for  accepting  or 
rejecting  the  connection.  He  signs  the  Confirm 
together with TS4 and LifetimeB* into SigB*. Then, 
he  sends  SigB*  along  with  encoded  message  to 
Node A. 
IV. Finally, Node A verifies received message from 
Node B and decrypts it. He ensures that LifetimeB* 
=  TS3-TS4  and  the  Confirm  message  is  accept 
confirmation to establish a connection. 
 
4.4 Data Confidentiality Approach 
Data  confidentiality  in  our  implementation  is 
achieved by encrypting every message exchanged in 
every communication session by sender Node. On the 
other hand,  the  encoded  message  is  decrypted  into 
original message by recipient Node. This approach is 
implemented  both  in  key  exchange  and  data 
exchange phases. The detail of our implementation is 
briefly described by the following steps of encryption 
scheme for a message M. 
I.  Generate  a  one-time  key  pair  (R,  c)  from  the 
global EC parameters and let R as a point on the 
curve. 
II.  Pick the x component of K = c×B as a string X, 
where B is the public key of recipient. 
III. Generate a mask Y. This is the same number of 
bytes as message M that uses the string X with the 
Mask Generation Function (MGF). 
IV. The final step is concatenation of the point R with 
the  encrypted  message,  whereas  the  encrypted 
message is the result of XOR between the mask 
and the message. 
V. The  process  of  message  decryption  to  retrieve 
original message is performed by generating the 
mask and XOR with the encrypted message. 
 
5. Experimental Results 
In  this  section,  we  explain  the  experimental 
results of our implementation. At first experiment, we 
test the ECDSA and ECDH with elliptic curves over 
Fp  and  CM  method  on  Laptop  PC  with  the 
specifications:  AMD  Dual-Core  processor  1.6GHz, 
2GB  RAM running on Ubuntu Linux kernel-2.6.35 
with  gcc-4.4  GNU  C  Compiler  and  GMP-5.0.5 
Library. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Comparisons of the total processing time in 
RSA-based and ECC-based Digital Signature Algorithm 
(DSA). 
  RSA 
ECC 
RSA 
ECC 
RSA 
ECC 
RSA 
ECC 
Bit length  1024 
160 
1536 
192 
2048 
224 
3072 
256 
Signature 
generation 
time (ms) 
1,182.93 
6.81 
3,663.65 
8.19 
7,076.35 
11.45 
17,223.12 
13.87 
Signature 
verification 
time (ms) 
582.69 
10.64 
1,738.40 
16.36 
3,451.21 
17.67 
9,270.83 
21.29 
 
Table  2  shows  the  total  time  comparisons  of 
signature generation and verification between RSA-
based  and  ECC-based  digital  signature  algorithm. 
The total time of signature generation varies from 7 
ms to 14 ms, and signature verification varies from 
11 ms to 21 ms in ECC-based algorithm. Meanwhile, 
the total time of signature generation varies from a 
second  to  17  seconds,  and  verification  time  varies 
from 580 ms to 9 seconds in RSA-based one. Here, 
the  security  level  of  160-bit,  224-bit,  and  256-bit 
length in ECC equal to 1024-bit, 2048-bit, and 3072-
bit length in RSA, respectively. This implies that the 
cost of computation time in elliptic curve technique is 
much more efficient than in RSA-based one. 
 
Table 3. Comparisons of signature size in RSA-based 
DSA and ECDSA. 
 
RSA-DSA 
ECDSA 
RSA-DSA 
ECDSA 
RSA-DSA 
ECDSA 
RSA-DSA 
ECDSA 
Bit length  1024 
160 
1536 
192 
2048 
224 
3072 
256 
Signature 
size (Bytes) 
9,868 
96 
14,799 
113 
19,715 
134 
24,482 
146 
 
 
Figure 2. Total processing times on Intel Mote2. 
 
We  also  compared  the  overhead  of  RSA-based 
DSA and ECDSA algorithm in term of signature size. 
The comparison of signature size is shown in Table 
3. For the bit-length of security level from 160-bit to 
256-bit in ECDSA, the signature size varies from 96 
to  146  Bytes  only.  On  the  other  hand,  RSA-based 
DSA suffers from a big size of signature. It varies 
from 10 to 24Kbytes in the variety of security level Communication and Network Systems, Technologies and Applications 
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from 1024 to 3072 bit length. This good feature of 
ECDSA can efficiently be implemented into low end 
performance  devices,  such  as  embedded  devices 
including Intel Mote2. 
 
Table 4. Total processing time of message encryption 
and message decryption. 
Bit length  160  192  224  256 
Message encryption 
time (ms)  1.605  1.608  1.610  1.607 
Message decryption 
time (ms)  1.098  1.103  1.101  1.099 
 
Based  on  the  reality  that  ECC  is  much  more 
efficient  than  RSA,  we  have  ported  ECDSA  and 
ECDH schemes into Intel Mote2 embedded device. 
Figure 2 shows the total time of signature generation, 
signature  verification,  and  ECDH  shared  key 
generation. We vary the bit length of cryptosystem 
from 160-bit to 256-bit in our measurement. The total 
processing time of signature generation varies from 
110  ms  to  152  ms.  Whereas,  the  total  time  of 
signature verification varies from 134 ms to 173 ms, 
and  total  time  of  ECDH  shared  key  generation  is 
relatively  constant  at  70  ms.  In  addition,  our 
approach  to  guarantee  data  confidentiality,  we 
implemented  message  encryption  and  message 
decryption. Table 4 shows the total processing time 
of message encryption and decryption algorithm. The 
total time of encryption and decryption processes are 
relatively constant for any bit-length of security level. 
They  are  only  1.6  ms  and  1.1  ms  for  message 
encryption and decryption, respectively. 
 
6. Security Issues 
The  proposed  ECDH  protocol  is  secure  because 
nothing is disclosed (except for the public keys), and 
no node can derive the private key of the other nodes, 
unless the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem 
(ECDLP)  was  compromised.  This  is  because  all 
nodes are only allowed to have public keys of other 
nodes. All participant nodes hide their private keys 
by embedding them into shared key KAB. Let consider 
to the following equation: 
 
KAB = dA×QB = dA×dB×G = dB×dA×G = dB×QA     (6) 
  
We introduced the use of timestamps and packet 
lifetime  in  every  session  of  communication  or 
transaction  between  two  nodes,  and  the  use  of 
random nonce to prevent a kind of reply attacks by 
un-authorized  nodes.  This  protocol  security  is  also 
supported by the use of digital signatures to provide a 
mechanism of mutual authentication scheme. We also 
encrypted  every  message  exchanged  in  every 
communication  session  to  guarantee  the  data 
confidentiality. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In  this  paper  we  have  presented  an 
implementation of elliptic curve digital signature and 
key  agreement  on  an  IEEE802.15.4  WSN  device. 
The experimental results show the practicality of our 
secure  WSN  system.  The  total  time  of  signature 
generation,  verification,  and  ECDH  shared  key 
generation  consume  low  cost  of  computation  time. 
They only consume computation time within 500 ms 
with the overhead of signature size within 200 Bytes. 
Our  future  works  include  the  implementation  of 
secure data exchange over WSN between nodes and 
between  nodes  and  the  gateway;  and  the 
consideration of multi-hops communications among 
nodes over WSN. 
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